. Authors thank Eric de Bodt, Marie Brière, Patrice Fontaine and participants of CREM seminar for comments on an earlier version of this paper. The final version of this paper has greatly benefited from the exchange with an anonymous referee. We warmly thank him or her for comments. rescheduling with reservation prices, we develop first a general parsimonious distribution-free structural framework. We derive sufficient conditions for rescheduling to take place and highlight situations where no rescheduling can occur. We characterize cases where rescheduling is for the creditor possible but sub-optimal. So the shareholder's reservation price can dramatically restrict the set of possible extensions and it does matter for the creditor. We then restrict our setting to undertake numerical analysis, our benchmark being the canonical rescheduling model of Longstaff (1990) .
Introduction
Rescheduling 2 is a popular way to reorganize capital structure and to renegotiate corporate debts in distress (Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) ). Both empirical evidences and anecdotic observations reveal that debt restructuring almost systematically involve rescheduling (cf. Gilson et al. (1990) ). On principle, rescheduling is a mean to postpone existing financial demands and constraints. It can have however many other merits as shown by the rich corporate finance literature on the debt maturity design (see Fan et al. (2012) for a recent study). This is especially the case when the new maturity is cooperatively designed by both the debtor and the creditor, because we can expect both interests to be taken in account.
When dealing with distressed debts, avoidance of liquidation costs is commonly recognized as the first determinant to decide rescheduling (Micucci and Rossi (2010) ). Longstaff (1990) notably develops a contingent claim analysis with liquidation costs. A piece of recent literature develops his canonical model further (see Harding and Sirmans (2002) , Moraux and Navatte (2007) , Chen et al. (2008) and Lee and Chung (2009)) 3 . In all these contributions, the creditor designs the rescheduling alone and he chooses the new debt maturity without facing special constraints. Consequently, it is sufficient for him to compare the price of the new rescheduled debt to the realization value he can get by seizing the distressed firm and liquidating the assets. In this vein of modeling, the representative shareholder appears surprisingly passive 4 . Of course, a strong argument for this passiveness is that she is better off in all rescheduling scenarios because her participation in the distressed firm is simply worth nothing. 2 Throughout the paper, rescheduling and debt maturity extension are synonymous. Harding and Sirmans (2002) , for instance, demonstrate in this setting that maturity extension aligns interests of borrowers and lenders better than renegotiation of principal and forgiveness do. And effectively, Franks and Sussman (2005) report only one case of debt forgiveness in their rich database made of 542 bank restructurings of small to medium size UK companies. 4 A notable exception is Moraux and Navatte (2007) who remark that the shareholder-manager has strong incentives to change the risk profile of the firm before entering renegotiation.
Analysis of existing literature reveals that all past contributions consider a unique reservation price: the liquidation value of the firm's assets for the creditor 5 . Other way saying, offering an epsilon to the shareholder is sufficient to make rescheduling possible. In the canonical framework, she has just no reservation price and is assumed to be essentially passive. Rescheduling is designed by the creditor as if he is "myopic" and "lazy", i.e. as if his decision just relies on a simple rule based on the liquidation value only. Of course, from a strict contractual viewpoint, considering passiveness and no reservation price for shareholders is completely correct. Once again, equity is worth nothing and, as recalled by Franks and Sussman (2005) , the creditor "has an exclusive right to decide whether, when and how to seize the company's assets and liquidate them".
Reality is of course not that simple and some remarks deserve to be done. First of all, this somewhat mechanical view significantly contrasts with empirical findings. Franks and Sussman (2005) , for instance, report that UK bankers behave far more subtly in the treatment of financial distress. They also find only mitigated results with respect to "lazy banking" 6 . Second, a too literal "contractualist" approach clearly excludes what is meant by "negotiation". In this sense, the canonical setting of Longstaff (1990) and followers where rescheduling is automatic and imposed by the creditor is outrageously asymmetric and in favor of this latter. Third, if rescheduling intervenes without consulting shareholders, then the traditional agency cost of Jensen and Meckling (1976) is certainly exacerbated. Nothing indeed prevents the so-called "passive" shareholder to act strategically after the "agreement" and, why not, at the creditor's expense. The creditor can then face ex post damaging changes of the business profile and/or some risk-shifting operation (see recent empirical evidences reported by Eisdorfer (2008) and Esmer (2013) ). The bottom line of this is that the creditor may be worse not to involve the representative shareholder during the rescheduling design. The "reservation price" perspective developed in this paper has neither been explicitly recognized elsewhere nor exploited in any mean by former contributions. 6 For short we can retain four issues: a) "banks' typical response to distress is an attempt to rescue the firm (rather than liquidate it automatically)", b) "banks do not hurry to exercise their liquidation rights and engage in a fairly elaborate rescue process", c) "bank's decision to liquidate a firm is sensitive to the firm's own restructuring efforts, such as replacing its managers" and finally d) "banks show an interest in the going concern value of the firm and do not confine themselves to valuing the firm's collateral".
The corporate finance perspective on the ongoing concern of the firm and the associated shareholder's behavior also questions the absence of such a reservation price.
Observing that a shareholder has no reservation price is not good news for the creditor. This is equivalent to detecting that the shareholder has nothing to lose entering the deal 7 . By entering what resembles a gamble for resurrection, she will act accordingly and the creditor may face after the "renegotiation" an extreme version of the asset substitution effect as discussed in-depth in Faure-Grimaud (1998, 2000) . Existence of a reservation price means by contrast that the shareholder is ready not to accept any rescheduling. Some rescheduling are just too minor to be conducted. When reservation prices exist and rescheduling is decided, the creditor (resp. the representative shareholder) can be reassured on the willingness/interest of the representative shareholder (resp. the creditor) to support the recovery project. The creditor can in particular consider the representative shareholder has a positive view on the future perspectives of the firm. In this sense reservation prices may reveal some private analysis. With this in mind, it is clear that assuming a non-zero reservation price for the shareholder is not necessarily a bad news for restructuring, the targeted recovery and the creditor's wealth. This paper is the first to develop a general distribution-free framework to analyze rescheduling of distressed corporate debt with reservation prices. It also extends the canonical setting of Longstaff (1990) to stress quantitative consequences of introducing a shareholder's reservation price. Our aim is to enrich the traditional view on rescheduling decision by introducing a reservation price for the representative shareholder and to investigate consequences on the debt maturity design. Of course, one may expect this "new" dimension to constrain, limit and prevent in some contexts corporate debt rescheduling.
However, the precise quantitative effect of the reservation price remains difficult to intuit.
First, the magnitude of the reservation price depends on the shareholders' preference that may be quite heterogeneous. Second, the magnitude of the reservation price may vary with the rescheduling design according to the shareholders' preference. The shareholder's decision 7 Another issue, we do not elaborate further, concerns the affective value in the eyes of the shareholder. Some shareholders could really face some difficulties to up-date their "beliefs" on the firm by confronting figures to reality and accepting the close-to-zero dollar value of equity in case of severe distress. For more discussion on such a behavioural issue, one refers to Davis et al. (2011). is indeed to enter (or not) a restructuring activity with a specific time dimension. This activity is moreover costly and risky until it comes to a happy end. Consequently, it appears important to consider situations where reservation prices are constant or alternatively depend on the duration of the rescheduling period 8 . In all cases, we expect debt rescheduling to differ significantly from the standard setting that simply neglects shareholder's reservation price.
The reservation price we introduce is the minimum value the representative shareholder has in mind to obtain from restructuring. This price acts for her as a threshold that triggers the decision to enter or not the risky deal. It doesn't impact directly the value of the firm's assets but it can significantly influence the total value of the firm (which is the total value of the claims) once the rescheduling is decided, through the design of the new financial set-up. Nothing is therefore paid as an investment. The reservation price is just a useful benchmark to appreciate the new equity price. We can more concretely understand the reservation price as the present value of extra compensations required to reward or to attract for some specific talents or skills, such as for example a deep knowledge of the industry.
Here, the reservation price is a virtual (rescheduling-dependent) "floor" dollar-compensation inciting to invest in a distressed firm with a specific saga. Accounting for a reservation price is also a way to bring into the model the value of other opportunities and exit options the shareholder can have in her portfolio. Finally, such a parameter can introduce a kind of behavioral dimension in a traditional contingent claim analysis 9 . Once a non-zero reservation price is taken into account, the post-restructuring value of equity is constrained to be more than epsilon. So, part of the shareholder's wealth is involved in the on-going business.
Consequently, she is incited to commit herself to ensure recovery and success, far more reasonably and strategically than in the canonical setting. Once again, existence of a non-zero reservation price for the shareholder is not per se bad news for other stakeholders. This amount must be balanced with the talent and skills of the representative shareholders and the expected return, recovery and growth of the firm's assets. This paper contributes to the literature by a) introducing reservation price of shareholders in the analysis of rescheduling, b) showing that and how reservation prices may 8 We thank the referee for this idea. See footnote 7. prevent alignment of interest between creditors and debtors, c) highlighting examples where rescheduling is actually feasible in an optimal way for creditors, just feasible or impossible to implement. In addition, we investigate potential exit solutions such as a change in the business model, introduce bargaining power of parties and resolve the associated asymmetric Nash bargaining game. Overall, the paper revisits the contingent claim analysis by considering (for the first time to the best of our knowledge) a couple of reservation prices in rescheduling. In simulations, we essentially capitalize on Longstaff (1990) and followers for benchmarking purposes 10 .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our structural framework equipped with a reservation price for the representative shareholder and one for the creditor. Section 3 introduces (distribution-free) analytical results and consequences of such reservation prices. We expose there the constrained optimization problem the creditor is supposed to solve. Section 4 undertakes simulations. Section 5 discusses a number of additional issues such as the asset substitution problem and the possibility to design the optimal rescheduling as the solution of an asymmetric generalized Nash bargaining game.
Section 6 provides empirical implications. Section 7 concludes.
The structural framework and problem statement
This section develops a parsimonious two-period setting to investigate rescheduling of distressed debt in presence of reservation prices. It must be stressed (and this will become clearer below) that the nature and the length of the two periods are not expected to be the same. The first one is given and deduced from the debt contract maturity, while the second one is endogenous and results from the design of rescheduling. It should be clear that a 10 Our analysis partly benefits from the (contingent claim) analysis of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) , because the representative shareholder owns a call option written on the firm's assets. An important difference exists however because the expiration of the call is endogenous and chosen by the creditor. The call expiration actually solves a constrained optimization problem and, if possible, the creditor will choose the optimal investment horizon highlighted by Longstaff (1990) . It is shown hereafter that this situation can occur only in special situations. In any case, some well known properties of the equity price do not hold anymore, because structural parameters can influence the endogenous horizon. Our aim in this investigation is to derive distribution free results. However we consider that the firm's asset value process can only diffuse after rescheduling meaning that it cannot jump... Diffusion processes introduce sufficient randomness in the analysis while avoiding dramatic problems when considering multiple threshold crossings in the reasoning. continuous time environment is preferable for modelling the optimal horizon on the second period.
Let it be a levered firm whose assets are currently worth 0 V and whose capital structure consists of equity and a single discount bond maturing at time 1 T and promising a face value 1 F . The equity is held by a representative shareholder. At the end of the first period that is at time 1 T , the firm can experience financial distress and rescheduling. The length of the second period is chosen by the creditor and eventually accepted by the representative shareholder. Financial markets contain riskless assets paying a constant interest rate denoted by r. Information is free and there is no tax, nor transaction costs, but there are some costs associated to the liquidation of bankrupt firms. Consequently, our setting is not perfect as per Modigliani and Miller (1958) and the total value of the firm is not equal to the firm's assets value. Rather, the total value of the firm is the firm's assets value net of imperfections that is minus the expected value of liquidation costs.
At the end of the first period (i.e. debt maturity 1 T ), the creditor effectively receives the face value 1 F if the firm's assets value is sufficient to cover the due payment ( To decide and design a maturity extension at time 1 T in case of default, the creditor rationally compares the continuation value of their debt to the reservation price. The continuation value of the debt is the value of the rescheduled debt   
where A 1 is the indicator function that is worth 1 if A is verified and 0 otherwise,   T or  ) and on the distribution of the firm's assets value. Of course, the creditor will extend the maturity of his debt (in distress) if and only if his net gain function is positive and by favoring, among possible horizons, the one offering the maximum net gain.
The optimal rescheduling period for the creditor solves the following (unconstrained)
where  represents the length of time to new maturity. This is the traditional setting to investigate and understand rescheduling, where no constraint is placed on the set of possible horizons (see Longstaff (1990) T is given. The benchmark function used by the representative shareholder to assess rescheduling at time 1 T is defined by the wealth she can expect from rescheduling minus the reservation price she has in mind or more formally:
where the integral expression captures the expected value of the discounted wealth the representative shareholder can obtain at time 2 T . For a given 2 T , the time  Option theory (see for instance Merton (1973, theorem 1) ) then tells us that wealth is strictly increasing with time to maturity 1 2 T T  . We therefore expect the shareholder to be better off increasing the rescheduling horizon, unless the reservation price depends on the extra granted duration in a way that balances the effect of time (this kind of shareholder's preferences is discussed below). The benchmark function exposed in equation (3) can be positive, negative or null depending on structural parameters, on the rescheduling design (i.e. the choice of 2 T )
11
Actually, the third equality of expressions (1) implies that the creditor's net gain function admits a maximum with respect to time to maturity. To understand this heuristically, remark that, for very near horizons 2 T , a recovery of the firm is just impossible and the event   . This is the case, for instance, in the canonical model of Longstaff (1990) and in the setting we develop in section 3. and on the distribution of the firm's assets value. In any case, the representative shareholder can accept the restructuring only if the rescheduling horizon is large enough to ensure that the claim she receives (the new equity) is higher than the reservation price she has in mind, or equivalently only if her benchmark function is positive. The bottom line of this discussion is that the creditor must design a rescheduling that keeps the shareholder's benchmark function positive. He must therefore solve the constrained optimization problem given by
To capture different shareholder's preferences, it is worth considering different specifications for the reservation price
13
. A constant reservation price will suit shareholders who are indifferent to the rescheduling duration. Otherwise, a reasonable reservation price is any strictly increasing function of the rescheduling duration, that is a any function having a positive first derivative with respect to the duration (or more formally
because the effort lasts longer as the rescheduling period gets larger. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this fruitful development.
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To avoid uninteresting situations, we will consider only reasonable values for the reservation price. In the following section, one will derive a number of sufficient conditions to highlight when rescheduling is feasible.
But, for the moment, it is sufficient to require the constant reservation price to be lower than the time 1 T value of the firm (which is of course the maximum value the shareholder can expect) and to demand the reward for effort per unit of time to be lower than the slope of the line that is tangent to the equity value viewed as a function of the rescheduling duration.
15 depending on specification and excluding 1 T for linear specifications.
balanced with the one of the reservation price. The most important point is that any benchmark function will decrease from a (more or less) long term horizon 2 T . The reason for this is that the wealth of the shareholder is bounded by 1 T V , whereas the reservation price is a strictly increasing function of the duration  . As 2 T tends to infinity, the time 
1
T value of the representative shareholder's wealth tends to 1 T V while the reservation price (unless constant) remains unbounded. This is typically the case, for instance, for our linear candidate
is duration dependent, nothing special happens to the rescheduling design described by equation (4), the benchmark function of the representative shareholder is just modified accordingly. For a linear specification, one has where the superscript 'de' insists on the fact that the computation is driven by the creditor's preference (T).
. Interestingly, for a given reservation price K , the creditor will (or not) be able to find an optimal rescheduling horizon
. In case he can, we can look for the largest reservation price compatible with such a choice. Let's denote it by
where no superscript is obvious because preferences are blended. Linear reservation prices provide interesting settings to consider. The role of the rescheduling duration indeed becomes rather subtle, because the maximum possible horizon for the representative shareholder (if any) is eq max T -the largest values of the two solutions of
. Moreover, when reservation prices depend on the duration to optimize, they are no longer exogenous but treated as an element of the problem.
Analyzing distressed debt rescheduling in presence of reservation prices
This section derives distribution-free results. The rescheduling maturity we consider solves the constrained optimization problem defined by equation (4) To begin this section, we sum up in proposition 1 the very first analytical pricing implications of the above distribution-free setting. Notice that we assume here that a rescheduling is possible. The rest of the section then highlights conditions under which restructuring is feasible and when and how reservation prices impact rescheduling. 
solves the equation (4) .
The total value of the firm is the sum of both and it equals
where Q stands for the proper probability.
Pricing formulae of proposition 1 are not as straightforward as they may seem at first sight
-if any, solves the constrained optimization problem (4).
Equalities related to the total value of the firm emphasize in different ways that rescheduling postpones potential liquidation costs firms to new horizon
. The last expression suggests for instance that the total firm's value will be a strictly increasing function of the 16 The equity price is a function of K only through the design of the rescheduling horizon, so formally one could simplify the notation to
rescheduling period for most dynamics we can consider for the firm's assets value. Granting an extra period of time in standard frameworks just gives the firm more chance to recover.
Proposition 2: A necessary condition for rescheduling to occur at horizon T is that the generic reservation price K and the rescheduling horizon T verify
Proposition 2 states that if the generic shareholder's reservation price is larger than the time-
1
T value of liquidation costs that can be saved by offering a recovery option to the firm, then no rescheduling can occur. Hence, while liquidation costs at time 1
key determinant for the creditor to decide rescheduling, the time-1 T value of saved liquidation costs constitutes a key determinant for stakeholders to decide rescheduling.
Proposition 2 places a bound on constant reservation prices and on slopes of linear specifications when a rescheduling horizon is known and, alternatively, it places a bound on the rescheduling horizon when the constant reservation price or the slope of linear specification is known. As a warning, it must be emphasized that proposition 2 states a necessary condition for rescheduling not a sufficient one and that it does not say anything on whether the horizon T is the optimal one to consider.
Proof:
If rescheduling is possible with maturity T, then both the net gain function of the creditor and the benchmark function of the representative shareholder are simultaneously positive so that
summing expressions implies that the total value of the firm is necessarily larger than
. Then, plugging the third equality of Proposition 1 gives Proof: The proof of proposition 2 reveals that if rescheduling occurs then
The proposition 2 states a necessary condition for rescheduling, not a sufficient one (this is therefore true for the corollary too).
) do not suffice for rescheduling to occur. There exist situations where no rescheduling can intervene, because conditions do not ensure that both parties are better off. Restructuring may take place at the expense of one party.
The following proposition presents situations under which rescheduling (only) is not an appropriate solution. This proposition shows that a failure to reschedule is possible because preferences (which are functions  and the generic K ) may be irreconcilable. 
because the wealth function is a strictly increasing function of T, it is a one-to-one function on appropriate intervals. And, because K is constant,
returns the minimum horizon that fixes the constraint. When the representative shareholder has a linear reservation price K , then the larger the slope, the longer the duration required by the shareholder. And the maximum slope admissible with
The next proposition highlights, in the case of constant reservation price, conditions under which rescheduling is optimal and conditions under which it is feasible although not completely optimal. To begin with, it is necessary to reconsider the creditor's optimization problem and then to shed more light on   K K * the function introduced in section 2 that, for a given level of reservation price, gives the maximum reservation prices the creditor's rescheduling decision can face. In section 2, it is defined by
. 
Lemma
solution of the unconstrained problem (2) or more explicitly: Lemma: The function 
, the reservation price is not binding and the unconstrained solution of the optimization problem applies. So the creditor chooses and implements the rescheduling 
solution of the unconstrained problem (2) and furthermore a couple of scenarios emerge: 
which is strictly larger than her reservation price, the "surplus" amounting to 
.
Proof:
The function is
and it is the maximum reservation price the representative shareholder can have, given that the creditor chooses
should be emphasized that for any K lower than
and it is still worth for the creditor to extend the distressed debt maturity. The third point iii) suggests the creditor to view the impact of reservation price as some opportunity costs. Actually, there is no incentive for him to grant more delay, otherwise surplus benefits to the shareholder. 
Proof: Scenarios depict possible situations exhaustively. All of them can exist, because values of parameters  and k admit no special relation in our setting.
Before ending this section, it is worth questioning whether results of Longstaff (1990) are recovered when K is set to zero. Proposition 2 is still verified because the contemporaneous value of liquidation costs you can expect to save is strictly positive in all cases. Let's now turn to Proposition 4 (resp. Proposition 5), it is sufficient to remark that   K T eq min drops to zero when K (resp. k ) is zero. This prevents both sub-optimal designs and impossibility result. Consequently, Longstaff (1990) solves the unconstrained optimization program (2) and focuses on  
. In this vein of reasoning, the largest reservation price compatible with Longstaff (1990) optimal
The next section proposes simulations and from now on we consider and extend the canonical framework of Longstaff (1990) .
Simulations
This section makes simulations to gain intuitions (both graphically and numerically)
about theoretical results of section 3. Because the length of the second period of our setting is chosen by the creditor (it is variable and endogenous), a continuous time framework is needed to describe the firm's assets value dynamics at any possible rescheduling horizon. To keep things comparable with existing research, we use for the firm's assets value the risk neutral value process considered by Longstaff (1990) and followers and we assume that increments over a small period of time dt are well described by . Structural parameters we consider for simulations are consistent with previous studies. In Table 1 for instance, our base case parameters are 34
. The realization rate  , that drives the creditor's reservation price, can typically take 17 This dynamics implies that log-returns of the firm's assets are normally distributed, but our conclusions do not change for other kinds of distributions. Notice that, if the new extended horizon 2 T was arbitrarily and exogenously fixed by the creditor, then the pricing of corporate equity and debt after rescheduling would be straightforward. For a new horizon 2 T , indeed, the net gain function of creditors is given by . Moreover, the representative shareholder's one is then are not that simple because the new horizon is endogenously given. Finally, it is interesting to note that the pricing probability in Proposition 1 is
. different values. There are chosen so as to emphasize a specific feature and/or lines with recent empirical findings. Note that Andrade and Kaplan (1998) 
INSERT FIGURE 2 SOMEWHERE HERE
Let us now gain in Table 1 As suggested by Proposition 4, opportunity costs borne by the creditor can be assessed by
. Opportunity costs he faces here amount to
, which is about 8%. As expected from 
Eq
) rescheduling is not that critical and the stake certainly negligible. The column dedicated to max K gives another way to understand the situation by showing how the maximum reservation price shareholders can accept is lower than the one we consider.
Further issues on corporate debt rescheduling with reservation prices
What about agency costs in corporate debt rescheduling with reservation prices? How to avoid the failure of rescheduling negotiation? What about the influence of bargaining power in the rescheduling design? Next paragraphs elaborate on these questions within the extended structural framework.
Ex post renegotiation moves and agency costs
Recent evidences show that corporate policies significantly change following financial arrangement (Eisdorfer (2008) , Esmer (2013) ). Esmer (2013) finds for instance that risk-shifting occurs even in the presence of increased creditor's control. One may expect this propensity to be exacerbated in stressed situations such as rescheduling negotiation
20
. In our setting; the firm's assets' volatility is the natural (and actually only) candidate to capture this issue. We expect from the traditional corporate finance literature agency concerns.
To assess the extent to which the shareholder has incentives to change the volatility ex post renegotiation, we can simply compute
these are the absolute and relative price differences of equity price when the firm's assets volatility is changed (by a percentage %   ) everywhere except in the determination of the rescheduling maturity. The absolute price difference is measured in euros or dollars, the relative one in percentage of the negotiated claim's price.
Corresponding agency costs may be computed by applying the same formulae to the debt price. We denote by
the above measures, where Claim can stand for either debt or equity.
Two kinds of strategies can occur after the rescheduling decision. The first one modifies parameters involved in the (risk neutral) decision process. The second one modifies parameters that do not directly impact the pricing problem at renegotiation. Here we can think about the expected (objective) rate of return of the firm's assets as a driver for such strategies… The real expected rate of return is currently hidden in the decision rescheduling process but it has potentiality to conciliate both parties. They should probably account for this earlier in the process i.e. during renegotiation. So we explore this point in a following paragraph. 
), meaning that the shareholder is significantly better off in relative terms by modifying the volatility of the optimal rescheduling. Another result is that the situation is not symmetric in the sense that the creditor does not face the loss that could correspond to the gain the shareholder enjoys (in both absolute and relative terms). The volatility effect is indeed not ranked the same, one has
is positive. Explanation for this comes from the total firm's value, which does not stay the same when the volatility is modified. We can deduce from this that the shareholder can capture most of the created value. Let's now have a look at volatility lowering from  to
As expected from corporate literature, there is no such incentive for the shareholder. Less intuitively, the effect is differently appreciated by the creditor. In line with standard theory, the creditor can be better off by lowering volatility, but this is not always the case if he designed rescheduling optimally. In such a case, the creditor can benefit from a small to moderate volatility change but he can then suffer from larger moves. The key driver of this is liquidation costs and the fact that the rescheduling horizon is fixed (and short). Lowering the volatility may decrease the (risk neutral) probability of recovery and increase the probability to face liquidation costs later.
How to make rescheduling feasible?
In real life, rescheduling may actually fail for different reasons but the setting we consider suggest to have a look at some key determinants. First of all, the reservation price the shareholder has in mind may be too large or too steep (in case of a linear specification).
To decrease the value or the slope of the reservation price, one may search for a "white knight" with lower requirements but still able to restore the firm 21 . This may force stakeholders to search actively for a key talent. Stakeholders can also change the firm's business characteristics and modify either its risk profile (that is the volatility) or the intangible nature of assets (that is the realization rate) or both. These possible solutions affect stakeholders differently and we explore this now. 
where n stands for the normal cumulative distribution function. The value of this is of course positive but its magnitude can significantly change depending on parameters.
Changing the firm's business profile can significantly influence the design of rescheduling and the tolerance of shareholders. Parties may question industrial restructuring strategies that may be worth for both. Both the assets' volatility  and the realization rate  21 Takacs (2011) shows for instance that in LBOs restructuring managers are fired in approximately 40% of cases.
capture the business profile of the firm in our setting ;  stands for the business risk while  reveals the nature of assets in terms of tangibility, obsolescence, specificity, demand, etc. 
Analysis reveals that changing
And it is not that clear whether this derivative is systematically negative for all ranges of structural parameters even if for most of them it is (see the left graph of Figure 1 for a typical example). So decreasing the realization rate increases the set of possible rescheduling horizons but the critical point here is that it also decreases the value the creditor can get in case of future default. This is not good news for the creditor so that he will certainly refuse.
To see this analytically, one can verify that the first derivative of the debt value with respect given that she has a reservation price of 7 or 2.5. T proving that rescheduling may or may not be possible and that creditors can expect or not the maximum net gain function depending on the volatility they choose.
Comments are in lines with properties highlighted in Table 1 22 . INSERT FIGURE 4 SOMEWHERE HERE
Introducing relative bargaining power
The previous framework investigates situations where the creditor decides the rescheduling period at the best of his interest under the constraint that the considered rescheduling horizon remains acceptable by the representative shareholder. In many concrete situations, however, the representative shareholder can influence the rescheduling design i.e.
can co-decide the length of the rescheduling period. Such a representative shareholder's bargaining power goes beyond the simple veto previously considered.
Mathematically, the net gain function of the representative shareholder enters the objective function and we face an asymmetric generalized Nash bargaining problem. The objective function to maximize is now made of both net gain function and it may be written : 
Empirical implications
The model has in turn a list of testable implications. First ones concern potential determinants of an agreed rescheduling. Arrival of a rescuer or any change in the managing team may lower the reservation price K and may have a positive effect on the rescheduling negotiation. Simulations also stress that, for two firms facing similar reservation price, the probability of successful rescheduling should decrease with the level of the business risk.
Terms of rescheduling can be useful to understand for external investors. First of all, they reveal information about the outcome creditor and shareholder expect. Second, terms of the agreement (once again) and the possible satisfaction of a shareholder's reservation price can constitute strong evidences of perceived quality by insiders. A satisfying rescheduling agreement may help discriminate among distressed firms. Another important question to investigate empirically is whether a rescheduling decision has some predictive power on potential recovery of the firm Theory exposed in section 3 suggests different ways to make rescheduling possible. It could be interesting to study the strategic behavior of firm's management before and after entering the (official) distress and rescheduling periods. Section 5 reveals that changing the business risk of the firm (that could be approximated by the standard deviation of firm's EBIT) or / and the realization rate β (specificity of assets, proportion of intangible assets) is a challenging but possible approach to find an agreement acceptable for shareholders. Why and in which situations alternative forms of agreement still subsist? Agency theory predicts that rescheduling can align interest of stakeholders better than debt write-off (see Harding and Sirmans (2002) ). Finally, determinants of unsuccessful deals could also be worth investigating. As suggested here, both difficulties to restructure the existing firm's assets and inefficiencies of the market for corporate control could matter.
Concluding remarks
When a representative shareholder has a (constant or linear) reservation price, known results on rescheduling of distressed debt may change dramatically. This is a goal of this paper to investigate the extent to which both reservation prices restrict the set of possible horizons the creditor can choose to design the rescheduled debt. We derive, in a general distribution-free setting, various analytical results and highlight situations where rescheduling is worth for both parties and situations where the creditor can even achieve the best design possible (i.e. the optimal design obtained with no constraint). We characterize cases where rescheduling is simply unfeasible. Essentially, a rescheduling may be viewed as a meeting of tolerances. For running numerical simulations, we extend the canonical model of Longstaff (1990) and give quantitative conditions under which such rescheduling will not be accepted by a representative shareholder due to her reservation price. We consider various reservation prices, all other structural parameters being constant, and verify that relaxing constraints increases the solution set or other way saying the lower the reservation price of the creditor (respectively of the shareholder), the larger the set of maturities he (respectively she) can consider.
This paper has in turn various managerial implications. When reservation price are not important, the question is whether the optimal rescheduling design can be achieved.
When reservation price are significant, the question is whether a suboptimal rescheduling can take place. Both issues depend on the current business profile of the firm and the level of reservation price. These concerns leave a room for strategic decisions. Modifying the business profile is an issue of operational or industrial restructuring. This may be more or less feasible and costly, depending on the industry. Reducing reservation price may be an issue of changing current managers and representative shareholders. This could explain why shareholders occasionally fire managers when distress occurs (despite their knowledge, skills, experience, entrenchment in the firm) and why they sometimes just give up the firm and let new investors to come in.
Here the rationale is to make rescheduling possible by lowering reservation price. If ever neither corporate rescuer nor raider can intervene, shareholders may benefit from this situation. Actually, they can compel the debt holder to negotiate more than expected. Such a situation can explain bargaining power of poor performing manager and shareholders.
Finally, our analysis suggests that the cutoff realization rate for refusing rescheduling is not one hundred percent as predicted by Longstaff (1990) but a lower value that depends on the shareholder's profile. Our microeconomic approach can then be enriched from the banker's perspective to account for portfolio risk concentration, competition, macroeconomic environment, regulation and other related issues. But such a richer agenda is left for future research. 
